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STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY P. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs • 
EARL N. DORIUS, Director, Driver's 
License Division, Department of 
Public Safety, State of Utah, 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case concerns the legality and reasonableness 
of the revocation of the driving license of Respondent 
by Appellant under the Utah Implied Consent Lav;, Section 
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DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Respondent will agree with the correctness of the 
statement found in the Brief of Appellant on the disposition 
of this case in the court below. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks the affirmation of the order of 
the lower court made on the 14th day of January, 19 75, which 
rescinded the revocation of the driving license of Respondent 
and restored the driving privileges of Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the 6th day of April, 1974, Trooper Clint Hendry 
of the Utah State Highway Patrol observed a vehicle, subsequently 
determined to have been driven by Respondent, proceeding south-
bound on a two-lane highway in the vicinity of 3500 South 
Redwood Road at approximately 2:20 or 2:30 a.m. (Findings of 
Fact 1; Trial Transcript 2-3). Noticing the weaving and slow 
speed of the vehicle, the trooper stopped the car. (Findings of 
Fact 3,4; T. 3, lines 3-14). Trooper Hendry smelled alcohol 
on or near Respondent's person, whereupon he administered 
field tests and feeling them unsatisfactory, placed Respondent 
under arrest for Driving While Under the Influence at approxi-
mately 2:40 a.m, (Findings of Fact 5; T. 4-6). Respondent was 
advised by Trooper Hendry of her Miranda Rights together with 
the Utah Implied Consent Law, and Respondent indicated that she 
understood (Findings of Fact 6; T. 6) . Respondent indicated 
to the trooper that she would submit to a chemical test but 
that she wished to consult with a lawyer prior to such test being 
conducted (Findings of Fact 7? T. 6, lines 21-26; T. 14, lines 
14-22). 
Trooper Hendry and Respondent arrived at the jail at 
approximately 3:10 a.m. (T. 7, line 6). After some preliminary 
iail procedures, Respondent was allowed to call and did call 
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her attorney, Richard Maughan, at approximately 3:30 a.m. 
(Findings of Fact 8; T. 7, lines 8-17). After Respondent 
conversed with her lawyer, she advised Trooper Hendry that she 
would submit to a chemical test of either her breath or blood, 
but did not desire to do so until her attorney arrived at the 
jail (Findings of Fact 9; T. 8, lines 27-28; T. 25, lines 4-7). 
Trooper Hendry, after speaking to Mr. Maughan on the phone, 
agreed to delaying the test until Mr. Maughan arrived at the 
jail (Brief of Appellant). The trooper was aware that Mr. 
Maughan did not live in Salt Lake City, but resided in Bountiful, 
Utah. (T. 18, lines 23-24).. 
At approximately 4:15 a.m., Respondent was advised 
by Trooper Hendry that she should again check with her attorney 
since he had not arrived at the jail. Respondent called the 
home of Richard Maughan and was informed that Mr. Maughan was 
on his way to the jail and advised Trooper Hendry that her 
lawyer was en route to the jail (Findings of Fact 10; T. 10, 
lines 3-11; T. 25, lines 23-30; T. 26, lines 1-6). Trooper 
Hendry waited an additional five to ten minutes and thereupon 
told Respondent he could wait no longer and advised Respondent 
concerning her rights regarding the chemical test of her breath 
or blood. Respondent advised Trooper Hendry she would submit 
to a test on the arrival of her lawyer (Findings of Fact 11; 
T. 10, lines 13-18; T. 26, lines 9-12). It was at this time, 
apparently, that Trooper Hendry first informed Respondent that 
unless she submitted to a chemical test he would file a refusal 
form (T. 10, lines 13-23). 
Trooper Hendry, immediately after the above discourse 
took place, left the jail and went to the packing lot of the 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice where he waited approximately 
fifteen minutes while completing his reports. The trooper 
informed no one that he would be waiting in the parking lot 
(Findings of Fact 12; T. 10, lines 24-26; T. 12, lines 15-18). 
Approximately five minutes after Trooper Hendry left the jail area, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
Mr. Maughan arrived at the jail to advise Respondent (Findings 
of Fact 13; T. 26, lines 9-12). Mr. Maughan told Respondent 
that he had been waiting ten minutes to see her (T. 26, lines 
14-15). Respondent was released on her own recognizance without 
having taken a chemical test approximately fifteen to twenty 
minutes later (T. 27, lines 19-20). 
Appellant in his statement of Facts contained in 
his Brief correctly states the conclusions of law of the trial 
court. 
ARGUMENT 
Contrary to the assertion of Appellant in Point Two 
of his Brief, Respondent does not argue nor did the trial court 
conclude that under the ruling of Hunter v. Dorius, 2 3 Utah 
2d 122, 458 P. 2d 877 (1969), the right of a defendant to 
consult with counsel prior to submitting to a chemical test for 
alcohol content necessarily includes the right to have counsel 
physically present at the time of the administration of the 
test. 
However, it should be noted that the issue of the right 
to have counsel physically present prior to submitting or during 
the administration of a chemical test under an Implied Consent 
Statute is far from resolved. In Schmerber v. California, 
384 US 757 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that 
where a defendant was arrested for Driving Under the Influence, 
a blood sample could be involuntarily withdrawn without violating 
defendant's right to due process or privilege against self-
incrimination. More specifically, the Court rejected a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel argument. The defendant had actually 
consulted with counsel who advised the defendant to refuse to 
submit to any chemical tests. The defendant claimed that 
compelling the test in light of a refusal based on advise of 
counsel denied the former's right to the assistance of an 
attorney. The Supreme Court concluded: Digitiz d by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
No issue of counsel's ability to assist 
petitioner in respect of any rights he did 
possess is presented. The limited claim thus 
made must be rejected. 384 US 757, at 766. 
As noted subsequently in United States v. Wade, 388 
US 218 (1967), the denial of the right to counsel claim in 
Schmerber v. California/ supra, was based on the attorney's 
inability to assist the defendant, under those facts, to any 
greater degree in respect to the defendant's rights than the 
attorney had already done by advising a refusal of the test. 
At least two state courts have recognized that the 
physical presence of the attorney prior to or during the 
administration of a chemical test is necessary to fully protect 
the rights of the defendant. In State v. Hill, 277 N.C. 547, 
178 S.E. 2d 462 (1971), the defendant, arrested for Driving 
Under the Influence, claimed that he requested an attorney but 
was not allowed to call one until after the chemical test was 
administered. Even after defendant's attorney arrived at the 
jail, he was not allowed to see his client. The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court held the right to have witnesses included 
the right to communicate with friends or a lawyer immediately 
after arrest for drunk driving. 
When one is taken into police custody 
for an offense of which intoxication is an 
essential element, time is of the essence. 
Intoxication does not last. 
...if one accused of driving while 
intoxicated is to have witnesses for his 
defense, he must have access to his counsel, 
friends, relatives, or some disinterested 
person within a relatively short time after 
his arrest. 
...the right of a defendant to communi-
cate with counsel and friends implies, at 
the very least, the right to have them see 
him, observe and examine him, with reference 
to his alleged intoxication. 178 S.E. 2d 462, 
at 466. 
Similarly, in Narten v. Curry, 33 Ohio Misc, 94, 291 
N.E. 2d 799 (1972), the Ohio Court concluded that the criminal 
aspects of a charge of Driving Under the Influence could not 
be ignored when considering the reasonableness of a refusal Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to take a chemical test under an Implied Consent Statute. 
Applying Argersinger v. Hamlen, 497 US 25, the court held that 
whenever a delay in taking a chemical test was due to the 
defendant attempting to reach counsel, that the delay could 
not constitute a refusal if the defendant subsequently agreed 
to submit to the test. 
POINT I 
Under the ruling of Hunter v. Dorius, 
supra, Utah Law recognizes a right to consult 
with counsel prior to submitting to a chemical 
test under the Utah Implied Consent Statute. 
Under the decision of this Court in Hunter v. Dorius, 
supra, Utah Law recognizes the right of an accused charged with 
Driving Under the Influence to consult with an attorney prior 
to submitting to a chemical test under the Implied Consent 
Law, Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The accused in Hunter v. Dorius, supra, was involved 
in a car accident at 8:00 p.m. The police arrived at the scene 
around 8:30. Accused was arrested and transported to the jail, 
arriving at 9:15 p.m. Accused v/as asked to take a chemical test 
but allowed to call an attorney. At one point, the accused did 
reach an associate of his attorney who advised him not to take 
any tests. At 9:48 p.m., the accused was advised of the 
consequence of any further refusal to take a chemical test as 
under Section 41-6-4 4.10, supra. When the accused still did 
not submit to a test, the officer filled out a refusal form 
completing it at 10:05 p.m. Shortly after the accused's final 
refusal to take the test until he spoke to his own attorney, 
and not merely his associate, his attorney did reach him at 
the jail and advised him to take the test. However, the officer 
refused to administer it. This Court held, 
After the plaintiff (the accused) had been 
advised as to his rights under the statute and 
the consequences of his refusal to submit to a test 
at the hour of 9:48 p.m., the plaintiff still 
had a reasonable time in which to make up his 
mind and seek legal counsel 458 P. 2d 877, at 879. 
The delay in submitting to the test nnt?1 contact 
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with another attorney, was considered "reasonable" under the 
Utah Implied Consent Statute. 
In Hunter v. Dorius, supra, one hour and eighteen 
minutes passed from the time of the initial stop by the police 
until the accused was advised of the consequences of further 
refusal to submit to a chemical test, with one hour and thirty-
five minutes total time elapsing. In the instant case, one 
hour and forty-five minutes passed from the initial stop of 
Respondent to her being advised of the consequences of any 
continued delay in submitting to the test, with two hours total 
time involved. The time in both instances are relatively close. 
But, a distinguishing fact is that in Hunter v. Dorius a call 
was completed to an attorney who advised the accused not to 
take the test and this refusal was told to the officer. The 
officer apparently did not viev; the refusal as final and allowed 
the accused to continue to try and reach his own attorney. 
While not expressily stated in the opinion, the Court seems 
to adopt an estoppel theory whereby the officer was precluded . 
from denying the accused's right to contact his own attorney 
before submitting to the test where the officer agreed to such 
an arrangement. At least, the officer was estopped until he 
started the "all-or-nothing" proposition at 9:48 p.m. 
Applying a similar theory to the case at bar, Appellant 
should be estopped from denying the reasonableness of Respond-
ent's delay in submitting to a test. Instead of agreeing to 
the accused delaying until contact with the personal attorney 
occurred, as in Hunter v. Dorius, supra, Officer Hendry agreed 
that Respondent could postpone taking the chemical test until 
her attorney arrived at the jail. As noted in the introductory 
paragraphs, Respondent does not argue that an absolute right 
to the physical presence of counsel prior to the administration 
of a chemical test necessarily exists. But, Respondent would 
argue that Appellant, by not protesting the delay and 
a f f 1 TTTl PJ +• i U O ~\ \r r* >- cs n 4- i* T^ f~* -J •*- ±-
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at 4:15 p.m. that Officer Hendry told Respondent that he would 
no longer allow a delay. Thus, at 4:15 p.m., with the 
explanation of the consequence of continued refusal, the "rea-
sonable period/' referred to in Hunter v. Dorius as starting 
at 9:48 p.m., began to run. Even at 4:15 p.m., an additional 
fact must be considered. Officer Hendry was informed at that 
time that Mr. Maughan, the attorney involved, had already left 
his home and would arrive shortly. Knowing this, the officer 
waited a few minutes and then left the station without informing 
anyone of his whereabouts. Considering all the circumstances, 
Respondent acted reasonably by relying on the officerfs 
assertions and delaying submission. After the full warning 
given at 4:15 p.m., Respondent, under the ruling of Hunter v. 
Dorius, still had a reasonable time to decide to submit to 
the test. 
POINT II 
When a statement of the Miranda Warning 
and rights is coupled with an explanation of 
an Implied Consent Statute, and confusion 
results in the mind of the accused as to the 
extent of the right to counsel, the accused 
should not be held strictly accountable for 
any delay in submitting to a chemical test 
arising out of this confusion. 
Even in jurisdictions which do not recognize any 
right to consult with counsel prior to submitting to a chemical 
test under an Implied Consent Statute, a defense does arise 
where a statement of the right to counsel under Miranda is 
coupled with an explanation of the Implied Consent Law. If 
this occurs and the accused is thereby confused and believes 
that he has a right to have an attorney present before submitting 
to any chemical tests, courts have held that the accused's 
delay must be deemed reasonable under the circumstances. But 
if the officer specifically informs the accused that the rights 
under Miranda do not apply to the taking of chemical tests 
under the Implied Consent Law, then the defense will not apply 
from that point in time forward. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In two cases cited by Appellant, the above referred 
to defense was expressly recognized. 
In Kauffman v. Motor Vehicles Division, Department 
of Transportation, Ore. App, 500 P. 2d 473 (1972), while the 
court found that the accused by refusing, under advise of 
counsel, to blow into a breathanalyzer a second time constituted 
a refusal under the Implied Consent Statute, the court initially 
discussed the reasonableness of the accused delaying the test 
until his attorney was physically present at the jail. Since 
the officer confused the accused by allowing the latter to 
believe that he could wait for his attorney to arrive, the Oregon 
Court concluded that the accused could not be held accountable 
for such delay. Subsequently, the Oregon Court re-affirmed 
its position in Kauffman in Cavagnaro v. Motor Vehicles Division, 
Department of Transportation, Ore. App, 528 P. 2d 1090 (1974). 
*
n
 Cavagnaro, after some delay occassioned by the accused 
believing that he could delay taking the chemical test until 
he had consulted with his attorney, the accused walked away 
from the officer while the former's rights were being read to 
him. Despite Oregon Lav; which does not recognize any right 
to consult with counsel prior to submitting to a chemical test, 
the Oregon Court still followed Kauffman and stated that the 
accused could not be held accountable for delays caused by 
confusion of his rights where such confusion was created by 
the officer. However, under the facts in Cavagnaro, the court 
held that the accused was not confused as to his rights so 
Kauffman was inapplicable. 
Recently, the Colorado Supreme Court has followed 
Kauffman, supra. The accused in Calvert v. State, Department 
of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Divisic.i, 519 P. 2d 341 (Colo. 1974) , 
was arrested for Driving Under the Influence and advised of 
his Miranda rights. When he asked to call an attorney, he was 
refused and then advised of the Implied Consent Law and the 
consequences of refusal but not told that his Miranda rights 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
were inapplicable in this context. The court noted that in 
Colorado no right to consult with counsel in regards to chemical 
tests for alcohol content is recognized. Additionally, the 
refusal to submit to a test until an attorney is consulted or 
has arrived would constitute a refusal as contemplated under 
the Colorado Statute. Nevertheless, citing Kauffman, supra, 
the Colorado Supreme Court concluded, 
Where, as here, law enforcement officers, 
even though inadvertently, either through an 
act of omission or commission, cause a 
suspect's misunderstanding of the state of 
the law, he cannot be held strictly accountable 
for his refusal to take implied consent tests 
519 P. 2d 341, at 343. 
The court reversed the revocation of petitionees 
license. 
Similarily, in California, a jurisdiction which also 
does not recognize any right to counsel under the Implied 
Consent Statute, the courts have consistently held that con-
fusion from reciting Miranda with the Implied Consent Law can 
constitute a defense to any alleged refusal on the part of 
the suspect. In Rees v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 8 Cal. 
App. 3d 746, 87 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1970), the court found that 
Miranda and the. Implied Consent Law had been given together, 
generating confusion, even though tne accused could not recall 
being advised of a right to counsel. The court hold that the 
refusal of the accused to take a chemical test which resulted 
from the accused not being told that his right to counsel was 
not applicable under the circumstances, was not the type of 
refusal contemplated by the statute to justify revocation of 
the accused's license. Rees follows a line of California 
cases recognizing the defense or exception: Weber v. Qrr, 
274, Cal. App, 21 288, 79 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1969); Wethern v. Qrr, 
271 Cal. App, 2d 813, 76 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1969); Rust v._ 
Department of Motor Vehicles, Division of Driver's Licenses, 
267 Cal App, 2d 545, 73 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1968). 
- - • • - J-~ u~,„„ =,r>r>i i ori fhp. caHiu reasoning as 
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Minn., 192 NW 2d 441 (1971), the court stated that the Miranda 
rights were not required under the Implied Consent Law since 
revocation of a license is a civil proceeding. But, where 
Miranda is given and no clarification is made of its inappli-
cability to taking the chemical tests, a refusal to take the 
test based on this confusion does not justify revocation of 
the accused's license. The Nebraska Supreme Court has held 
that there is no right to counsel under the Implied Consent 
Statute; but, again, where confusion as to this right results 
from the giving of Miranda, the accused cannot be deemed to 
have refused the test by delaying submission until his attorney 
arrives. Wiseman v. Sullivan j.90 Neb. 724, 211 NW 2d 906 (1973). 
While Utah recognizes a right to consult with counsel 
prior to submitting to a chemical test for alcohol content, 
this court has not specifically addressed the question of the 
extent to which confusion arising from the giving of Miranda 
with the Implied Consent Law will justify an accused delaying 
the submission to the test until his attorney is physically 
present. The issue was recently raised in McCall v. Dorius, 
527 P. 2d 647 (Utah 1974), but this court concluded that under 
the facts no actual confusion arose but the accused was merely 
being uncooperative, pretending not to understand. 
Very different facts from McCall v. Dorius, supra, 
are presented in the case at bar. Here, Officer Hendry 
initially informed Respondent of her Miranda right to counsel 
while reading her the Implied Consent Law (T. 6). The two 
statements were actually together on the same printed form (Findings 
of Fact 6), and contained no statement that the right to have 
an attorney present did not. apply to the taking of chemical 
tests. At no time did Officer Hendry or any other officer 
explain to Respondent that Miranda was not necessarily applicable 
under the circumstances. Rather, Officer Hendry reinforced 
Respondent's belief that she could delay the taking of the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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officer inform Mr- Maughan, the attorney, that it was unacceptable 
to delay the tests until the latter1s arrival. Finally, at 
4:15 when the officer informed Respondent of the consequences 
of any further delay in submitting to the test, he still had 
not informed her that she did not have a right to the presence 
of her attorney as stated under Miranda. Rather, Respondent 
was placed in the dilemna of taking the test, even though 
informed in the second phone call to Mr. Maughanfs home that 
her attorney was to arrive within minutes; or, of preserving 
what she believed to be her constitutional rights as stated by 
the officer himself, and refusing the test until her lawyer 
arrived. 
By the officer's omission of any statement of clari-
fication of Respondent's rights under Miranda and the Implied 
Consent Statute, and by the Officer's acquiescence in delaying 
the tests until the attorney arrived, Respondent was confused 
as to her rights. According to the officer's testimony, 
Respondent remained cooperative throughout the entire incident, 
never refusing the test but merely delaying it until her 
attorney arrived. This type of good faith confused effort on 
the part of Respondent to do whatever was legally required 
while still perserving her constitutional rights as stated by 
the officer should be viewed as a reasonable refusal, and not 
the type of refusal which would justify the revocation of her 
license. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Hunter v. Dorius, Supra, an accused charged 
with Driving Under the Influence has a right to consult with 
counsel prior to submitting to any chemical tests under the 
Implied Consent Statute, Section 41-6-44.10, supra. No right 
to the physical presence of the attorney is argued under the 
facts of this case. But, under either the estoppel theory or 
by confusion generated from the giving of Miranda with the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Implied Consent Law, Respondent's delay in submitting to 
any test until her attorney arrived at the jail should be 
deemed reasonable under the Statute. The trial court's order 
rescinding the revocation of Respondent's license should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. GILBERT ATIIAY 
Attorney for Respondent 
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